People v. Reynolds, 2016 IL App (4th) 150572 (June). Episode 195 (Duration 7:00)
This extrajurisdictional stop is actually legal because the original traffic infraction was a misdemeanor, something more than a petty offense.
Defendant filed a petition to rescind her statutory suspension. She argued her arrest was improper because the stop occurred outside the city borders.
Defendant did not challenge her speeding as a basis for the initial stop.
Specifically, defendant challenged the officer’s jurisdiction to arrest her because Southern View’s municipal boundary did not encompass the northbound lane of Sixth Street. (Apparently, the southbound lanes of Sixth Street in the vicinity of where defendant’s speed was clocked is in Southern View.)
Defendant filed an affidavit from the Springfield zoning administrator to prove the northbound lane of Sixth Street was not within the bounds of Southern View. The trial court granted rescinded the SSS based on lack of jurisdiction.
During the stop, the officer smelled alcohol coming from defendant’s car. He then discovered an empty bottle of whiskey.
She blew .231 into the PBT and refused to blow at the station.
Way back in January we had another Weird Little Extra-Territorial DUI Arrest Case (Episode 160).
Remember, in this extra-territorial arrest cases the rules and laws all are a big jumble. However, the underlying principle is that:
Although generally an officer can arrest a person outside its jurisdictional lines if we have a felony or a misdemeanor, but the officer is not allowed to stop a car outside its jurisdiction for a mere traffic infraction or other petty offense.
An officer from city A cannot stop a car in city B for a traffic violation that occurred in city B. When that happens we have an illegal stop. A motion to suppress then follows where a trial judge is likely to exclude all the subsequent evidence of intoxication.
The relevant portions of the arrest statute permit a stop outside an officer’s primary jurisdiction if (1) the initial crime occurs within his jurisdiction or (2) an on-duty officer “becomes personally aware of the immediate commission of a felony or misdemeanor violation of the laws of this State.” 725 ILCS 5/107-4(a-3)(1), (2).
The reviewing court now says that the trial court was wrong.
The relevant portions of the arrest statute permit a stop outside an officer’s primary jurisdiction if (1) the initial crime occurs within his jurisdiction or (2) an on-duty officer “becomes personally aware of the immediate commission of a felony or misdemeanor violation of the laws of this State.” 725 ILCS 5/107-4(a-3)(1), (2)
The evidence in the record shows Cathers observed and stopped defendant outside the bounds of Southern View.
As a result, section 107-4(a-3)(1) cannot serve as a basis for the stop…but Defendant was pulled over for driving 61 miles per hour in an area with a 35-mile-per-hour speed limit, or 26 miles over the speed limit. Traveling 26 miles-per-hour over the speed limit is a Class B misdemeanor. See 625 ILCS 5/11-601.5(a).
The officer personally observed the immediate commission of this offense. Neither party challenges defendant’s speed. As a misdemeanor offense, the officer was justified in stopping defendant under the arrest statute.
Finding the stop by the officer was justified and authorized under the arrest statute, the trial court erred in granting the petition to rescind.
The Other Laws
Three different statutory sections quoted above apply to the issue in this case. Each section, by itself, appears susceptible to a single, plain, and ordinary interpretation.
Section 7-4-7 of the Municipal Code defines a single police district as territory which is embraced within the corporate limits of adjoining municipalities within the same county within this State (65 ILCS 5/7-4-7).
Section 7-4-8 of the Municipal Code describes the powers of a police officer within a police district (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8). Notably, section 7-4-8 states “police of any municipality in such a police district” suggesting more than one municipality falls within a single police district. Both sections appear under the division entitled “Territorial Jurisdiction.” 65 ILCS 5/7- 4-1 to 7-4-8.
Under the plain and ordinary meaning of these sections, an officer has “full authority and power” in his own municipality and any adjoining municipality in the same county. Section 7-4-8 of the Municipal Code endows officers with “full authority and power” (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8) within any municipality in a police district.
While defendant attempts to construct an argument that section 7-4-8 conflicts with the arrest statute, section 104-7(a-3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the reviewing court found no conflict. The arrest statute applies, as discussed below, to any jurisdiction in the State, whereas the Municipal Code provisions apply to extend the jurisdiction of police officers in a police district, defined as adjoining municipalities in the same county.
The appellate court also found that officer had jurisdiction solely based on the arrest section of the Criminal Procedure Code. On its face, section 107-4(a-3), quoted above at supra, affords police the jurisdiction to effect an arrest in any jurisdiction as long as one of the enumerated provisions applies.