DUI On A Bridge Causes Huge Jurisdiction Problem

People v. Lampert, 2019 IL App (5th) 180248 (May). Episode 640 (Duration 16:08)

Defendant crashes on the bridge from Illinois to Kentucky fun jurisdictional SNAFU ensues.

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Gist

Kentucky police handled an Illinois DUI.

The Illinois – Kentucky Border

In Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 389-90 (1991), after declaring that the boundary between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the State of Illinois was the low-water mark along the Ohio River’s northern shore as it existed in 1792, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case “to the Special Master for such further proceedings as may be necessary to prepare and submit an appropriate decree for adoption by the Court, locating the 1792 line.”

In December 1994, after such proceedings were held, the Special Master filed a report with the Court advising that the United States Geological Survey had used 7355 geodetic coordinate points to identify the 1792 low-water mark as nearly as it could presently be determined and had prepared maps identifying a proposed boundary line based on those coordinates. Illinois v. Kentucky, Report of Special Master, Original No. 106 (1994) 6-9.

The decree ordered that copies of the decree and copies and prints of Joint Exhibits 3 through 26 be filed with the Secretary of State of Illinois, the Secretary of State of Kentucky, and the county clerk’s offices of the Kentucky and Illinois counties along the Ohio River, including Massac and McCracken. Id. In January 1995, the Court adopted the Special Master’s report and entered the proposed decree. Illinois v. Kentucky, 513 U.S. 177 (1995).

The Brookport Bridge

The bridge is about 1 mile long.

Prior to this case, there had been an agreement with Illinois to where Kentucky would police every bit of the bridge, and Illinois would conduct maintenance on every bit of the bridge. The agreement as to the policing of the entire bridge had been abandoned after the Kentucky charges against the defendant had been dismissed.

Police had never actually seen a written agreement and had only been advised of the agreement’s existence. But the agreement had amicably governed the jurisdiction of the Brookport Bridge for at least 21 years without ever being questioned or challenged.

The Accident On The Bridge

McCracken County sheriff’s department in Kentucky were dispatched to the Brookport Bridge to respond to a reported head-on collision involving a pickup truck and a car. Illinois officers also assisted.

The accident occurred on the Illinois side of the bridge along a curve “over dry land in Illinois.” It was also noted that the curve where the accident occurred was a “bad location” that had been the scene of numerous prior collisions.

The truck collided head on with a car driven by a lady who had to be removed from the car and hospitalized. Defendant’s passenger also needed some medical attention.

Contact With Defendant

When Kentucky authorities got there they saw defendant standing outside his truck with his female passenger.

They then saw him throw something off the bridge. Police went down there because it was still over dry land. They discovered a small bag of marijuana, a pipe with marijuana residue, and a pack of rolling papers. Jones took possession of the items and later booked them into evidence.

Defendant Was Driving

Apparently, the defendant claimed that he had not been driving. However, at the hospital defendant’s female passenger told police that defendant had been driving. Police noticed at the bridge that defendant had exhibited slurred speech and was unsteady on his feet. There was also an odor of alcoholic beverage about the defendant’s person, and his eyes were red and glassy.

Defendant was already at the jail because he was being charged with the drugs. Later he was charged with DUI in Kentucky.

He refused all FST’s except the HGN.

The Kentucky Charges

The Kentucky charges against the defendant had been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds based on the case law regarding the low-water mark of the Ohio River.

The Illinois Charges

In February 2016, a Massac County Illinois grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(A), (C)), one count of obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1)), one count of unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(b)), and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a)).

The Illinois Extraterritorial Statutes

725 ILCS 5/107-4(a-3) says that:

Any peace officer employed by a law enforcement agency of this State may conduct temporary questioning pursuant to Section 107-14 of this Code and may make arrests in any jurisdiction within this State: (1) if the officer is engaged in the investigation of criminal activity that occurred in the officer’s primary jurisdiction and the temporary questioning or arrest relates to, arises from, or is conducted pursuant to that investigation; or (2) if the officer, while on duty as a peace officer, becomes personally aware of the immediate commission of a felony or misdemeanor violation of the laws of this State…

Thus, it would appear that an officer can indeed make a misdemeanor DUI arrest outside their own city boundaries.

725 ILCS 5/107-3. Arrest by private person.

Any person may arrest another when he has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being committed.

An exception to the common law rule arose from section 107-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code), which allows a private person to arrest another person when “he has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being committed.”

It’s quite clear these Kentucky police officers were acting outside the scope of a private citizen.

Issue

defendant maintains that all of the actions of the Kentucky officers were improper, if not illegal. In response, the State says, among other things, that even assuming that the defendant’s extraterritorial arrest had resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights, suppression of the evidence obtained by the Kentucky officers was not warranted under the “good faith” principles generally recognized in People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799.

Trial Court Grants The Motion

The court therefore granted the defendant’s motion to suppress with respect to the evidence, “including the officer’s observations,” obtained at the jail and denied the motion with respect to the cannabis, the drug paraphernalia, and the questioning and observations that had occurred in Illinois.

Fourth Amendment Search & Seizure

The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, guarantees to all citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

A “seizure” occurs when an individual’s freedom of movement is restrained by physical force or a show of authority (United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980)), and “for purposes of the fourth amendment, a seizure is an arrest” (People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 346 (2008)). Article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6) contains a search-and-seizure clause similar to the fourth amendment’s, which is interpreted “in ‘limited lockstep’ with its federal counterpart.” LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16.

The Exclusionary Rule

To deter unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the fourth amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995).Where applicable, the exclusionary rule precludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 227 (2006).

Notably, “the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009). “Instead, application of the exclusionary rule has been restricted to those ‘unusual cases’ where it can achieve its sole objective: to deter future fourth amendment violations.” LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984)).

Importantly, because the suppression of evidence will often work to suppress the truth and effectively pardon the commission of a criminal offense, application of the exclusionary rule requires that the deterrent benefit of suppressing the evidence outweigh the substantial social costs. Because the exclusionary rule focuses on the flagrancy of the police misconduct at issue, it should not be applied reflexively.

It’s a deterrent against unlawful and willful police misconduct. “Thus, exclusion is invoked only where police conduct is both ‘sufficiently deliberate’ that deterrence is effective and ‘sufficiently culpable’ that deterrence outweighs the cost of suppression.” LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 24 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).

The Good Faith Exception

Accordingly, “even when a fourth amendment violation has occurred, the evidence that resulted will not be suppressed when the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.” Id.

The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when the police acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence. Bonilla, 2018 IL 122484, ¶ 35; LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 24.

When determining whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable, a court must consider whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that his conduct was illegal in light of all of the circumstances. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 25. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule recognizes that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served where the evidence sought to be suppressed was obtained as a result of “nonculpable, innocent police conduct.”

The good-faith exception thus applies where the police act in reliance on the legal landscape that existed at the time, so long as it was objectively reasonable to do so and a reasonable officer would not have suspected that his conduct was wrongful under the circumstances. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 31. The United States Supreme Court has thus found that the good-faith exception is applicable where an officer reasonably relies on a search warrant later deemed invalid, on binding judicial precedent upholding a statute later deemed unconstitutional, or on erroneous arrest-warrant information obtained from a database maintained by judicial or police employees.

The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule also recognizes that police officers should not be penalized for errors made by other officials upon whom they must rely to execute their duties and responsibilities. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 240-41. Id. at 238-40.

Should The Good Faith Exception Apply In This Case?

Because the agreement between Illinois and Kentucky represented the relevant legal landscape that existed at the time, all of the officers who responded to the defendant’s accident believed that Kentucky had jurisdiction over any incident that occurred on the bridge.

Mistaken or not, that belief was objectively reasonable, because prior to this case, Kentucky had been exercising such jurisdiction. Furthermore, while the agreement was in effect, there were no signs on the bridge marking the territorial boundary line between Kentucky and Illinois. Under the circumstances, all of the officers who responded to the defendant’s accident acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful, and by merely responding to the accident and working it as they had always worked accidents on the bridge, none would have suspected otherwise.

A reasonably well-trained officer would not have believed that his or her conduct was improper under the circumstances.

Well Somebody Was Negligent

The Illinois v. Kentucky was decided nearly 30 years ago, a reasonably well-trained officer should have known that because Kentucky’s northern border did not extend past the Ohio River’s low-water mark as it was in 1792, the curve in the Brookport Bridge was Illinois territory.

The defendant relatedly argues that the present case demonstrates recurring negligence on the part of the police.

We disagree.

Although it is axiomatic that a reasonably well-trained officer would be expected to know the boundaries of the areas that he or she is ordered to police, the officer does not establish those boundaries and does not have the authority to do so.

Police Entitled To Rely On Other Officials

Police officers are entitled to rely on traditional sources for the factual information on which they decide and act, which would necessarily include boundary markers and signs. Police officers are further entitled to rely on information received from their dispatchers and instructions received from their supervisors, particularly where those instructions are not inconsistent with their personal knowledge and experience.

Police officers are not expected to be “legal technicians”, however, and a reasonably well-trained officer is not responsible for anticipating or resolving legal matters that are beyond his or her purview.

Here, it was not the responding officers’ responsibility to determine whether Illinois v. Kentucky might have changed the legal landscape that had been governed by agreement, nor was it their responsibility to locate and mark the Illinois-Kentucky boundary line on the Brookport Bridge. See 605 ILCS 5/2-202, 4-201.12; 625 ILCS 5/11-301, 11-303; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 189.010(3), 189.231, 189.337.

Problem Fixed Now

Lastly, because there are now signs on the Brookport Bridge marking the boundary line between Illinois and Kentucky and because the McCracken County sheriff’s department no longer polices the Illinois side of the bridge, it is unlikely that an extraterritorial arrest like the defendant’s will reoccur.

As previously noted, “real deterrent value” is a “necessary condition for exclusion” (Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596)), and the “sole objective” of the exclusionary rule is “to deter future fourth amendment violations” (LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22).

Holding

Here, excluding the evidence in question would not serve that objective and would only punish the cooperative police work of the officers who acted with an objectively good-faith belief that the defendant’s accident had occurred in Kentucky’s jurisdiction. The exclusionary rule “simply cannot be applied to a situation where it offers little or no deterrent benefit and where there is not the least bit of culpability that can be charged to the officer’s conduct.” LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 51.

Because the exclusion of evidence is a court’s “last resort” (Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶ 51), we conclude that the court should not have ignored the State’s good-faith argument and should have denied the defendant’s motion to suppress in its entirety.

We reverse the portion of the court’s judgment that granted the motion with respect to the evidence obtained at the McCracken County (Kentucky) jail. Reversed and remanded.

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