People v. Moffett, 2019 IL App (2d) 180964 (December). Episode 774 (Duration 12:55)
I strongely encourage you to listen to episode 730. You should find it right below this episode.
The issue on appeal is whether those continuances also applied to count II of the indictment. If they did not, then defendant’s speedy-trial rights were violated with respect to that count.
The Williams Rule
We turn, then, to the criteria that determine whether a delay attributable to a defendant on an original charge is also attributable to the defendant on a subsequent charge.
The supreme court has adopted standards from the appellate court decision in People v. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1981). See People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1998). The so-called “Williams rule” states:
“Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges. Continuances obtained in connection with the trial of the original charges cannot be attributed to defendants with respect to the new and additional charges because these new and additional charges were not before the court when those continuances were obtained.”Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49.
What Is A New And Additional Charge?
The question of whether a subsequent charge is a new and additional charge is intertwined with the question of whether the original and subsequent charges were subject to compulsory joinder.
The supreme court has “clarified that [the Williams rule] applies only when the original and subsequent charges are subject to compulsory joinder.” People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100.
Thus, “if the initial and subsequent charges filed against the defendant are subject to compulsory joinder, delays attributable to the defendant on the initial charges are not attributable to the defendant on the subsequent charges.” People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191, 207 (2003).
Section 3-3 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/3-3) sets forth the criteria for determining when joinder is compulsory:
The supreme court has clarified that a speedy-trial/compulsory-joinder analysis must have regard for “the purpose of the rule set forth in Williams,” which is “to prevent ‘trial by ambush.’ ” Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d at 67 (quoting Williams, 204 Ill. 2d at 207).
A Hobson’s Choice For Defendant
The supreme court has elaborated on that purpose, stating that without the Williams rule the State could lull the defendant into acquiescing to pretrial delays on pending charges, while it prepared for a trial on more serious, not-yet-pending charges.
When the State filed the more serious charges, the defendant would face a Hobson’s choice between a trial without adequate preparation and further pretrial detention to prepare for trial.
The focus is on whether the original charging instrument gave the defendant sufficient notice of the subsequent charges to prepare adequately for trial on those charges.
If the original charging instrument gives a defendant adequate notice of the subsequent charges, the ability to prepare for trial on those charges is not hindered in any way. Thus, when the State files the subsequent charge, the defendant will not face a Hobson’s choice between a trial without adequate preparation and further pretrial detention to prepare for trial.
Rather, the defendant may proceed to trial on the subsequent charges with adequate preparation instead of being forced to agree to further delay.
Aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05) is predicated on battery, and section 12-3(a) of the Code defines battery:
“A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)
(1) causes bodily harm to an individual or
(2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.”
So Were These New And Additional Charges?
In this case, the two charges we compare are the single count in the original complaint (aggravated battery: bodily harm) and count II of the subsequent indictment (aggravated battery: insulting or provoking contact).
As defendant emphasizes, these subsections have distinct proof requirements.
The original aggravated battery charge alleged that defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to a CO by biting her. Defendant was thus placed on notice that the State intended to hold defendant accountable for biting a corrections officer.
Defendant should have anticipated that the State, having charged that defendant’s conduct caused bodily harm, would in time also charge that it was insulting or provoking.
This is especially true given the type of act alleged. Biting is, by our societal standards, particularly distasteful given its invasive nature and attendant risk of contamination and infection.
The issue, rather, is whether the speedy-trial term applicable to count II of the indictment had expired by the time defendant filed her motion to dismiss.
We hold that count II of the indictment was not a new and additional charge under the Williams rule. Therefore, the continuances attributable to defendant on the original battery charge were also attributable to her on the subsequent charge, and the State did not violate defendant’s speedy-trial rights with respect to count II.