People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL 130693 (November). Episode 1080 (Duration 11:15)

The State’s burden of proof does not require it to specifically address every conceivable condition or combination of conditions and argue why each condition does not apply.

Facts

Suspect was on antipsychotics and not taking his medication when he stabbed the victim repeatedly in the chest and upper body. 

After reviewing the State’s proffer and the parties’ arguments, the circuit court found the proof was evident that defendant committed a detainable offense, he posed a real and present threat to the safety of Geibel, and no release conditions could mitigate the real and present safety threat defendant posed. When addressing that there were no conditions that could mitigate the safety threat defendant posed, the court stated, 

“I understand the concept of mental illness, but it does not appear as if the defendant was taking his medicine which was previously prescribed to him in order to combat his antipsychotic behavior along with his bipolar, so that is a greater concern to me and it certainly poses a question as to whether or not he would be in a position where he could abide by the conditions of pretrial release. As such, I will find that the defendant here does meet the dangerousness standard and he shall remain detained.”

Analysis

Under the amended Code, every person charged with an offense is presumed eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 6.1(e) (West 2022). The State must file a verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release, and the circuit court shall hold a hearing on the petition. Id. § 110-6.1(a). When seeking denial of pretrial release, the State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case; and (3) 

“no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, for offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a), or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight for offenses listed in paragraph (8) of subsection (a).” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). 

Issue

Defendant appeals arguing the State failed to meet its burden as to the third element contained in section 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) of the Code. Specifically, defendant maintains that the State offered no evidence and made no argument regarding possible conditions of release that could mitigate any risk posed by his release. Thus, the issue before this court is whether the State met its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any threat defendant posed. 

Holding

We hold that, while section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code places the burden of proof on the State, the State’s burden of proof does not require it to specifically address every conceivable condition or combination of conditions and argue why each condition does not apply.

Absent from the statutory language outlining what the State must prove in order to detain defendant is any language requiring argument as to specific matters or language dictating what evidence or argument the State must present in attempting to meet its burden. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3).

Rather, the State must meet its burden and present sufficient evidence regarding the specific scenario presented by each case, such as the nature and circumstance of the offense, the defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s risk assessment score, and other considerations known to the State at the time of the hearing (see id. §§ 110- 6.1(f)(7), 110-10(b)), that allows the circuit court to determine whether pretrial release is appropriate.

To the extent defendant argues that the State cannot meet its burden by offering evidence and argument based on the statutory factors in section 110-5 of the Code, we disagree. 

Section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code does not preclude the State from presenting evidence as to the statutory factors in section 110-5 to clearly and convincingly establish that no conditions can mitigate the safety threat posed by a defendant’s release. See id. § 110-6.1(e)(3). It comports with logic that the State will present evidence as to the statutory factors in section 110-5 of the Code because those factors guide the circuit court in its consideration of whether conditions exist that would in part reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community. See id. § 110-5. 

Based on the evidence known to the State at the time of the pretrial detention hearing, the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release could mitigate the safety threat defendant’s pretrial release posed to Geibel. Defendant fails to explain how the State was expected to address mitigating conditions on the undisclosed issue of his mental health. 

Ultimately, it is up to the circuit court to review the evidence presented and determine whether conditions of release would mitigate the safety threat posed by a defendant. See id. §§ 110-5, 110-6.1(g). Here, the circuit court heard all the evidence and determined that, because defendant failed to comply with his doctor’s directives to take his prescribed medication, he would not comply with conditions of release.

Accordingly, we find the circuit court did not err in granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release.

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People v. Hammerand, 2024 IL App (2d) 240500 (November). (Defendant’s new crimes while on pretrial release can be evidence that there are no conditions that will prevent him from being charged with a new felony or A misdemeanor.) 

Gist

Defendant was charged in this case with two felonies and a Class A misdemeanor, and, while on pretrial release, he was charged with another felony and three more Class A misdemeanors.

Thus, his revocation is governed by section 110-6(a) (id.). 

The trial court granted the State’s petition the same day, revoking defendant’s pretrial release in the instant case. The court stated that it had reviewed the State’s exhibits, and it found that the State had met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant violated his pretrial release conditions when he committed new offenses in three separate cases, specifically committing a felony in No. 24-CF-1442 and Class A misdemeanors in Nos. 24-CM-1131 and 24- CM-1136. It further found that no condition or combination of conditions would prevent defendant from being charged with subsequent felonies or Class A misdemeanors. It explained that defendant had already been instructed not to commit any new offenses or go back to the “protected property,” but, on two separate occasions, defendant went back to the protected property. Furthermore, defendant had been charged with committing several new offenses while on release. Thus, the court did not believe conditions such as electronic home monitoring would prevent defendant from committing future criminal offenses.

He further argued that conditions such as home monitoring, a no-contact order, or a psychological evaluation and its resulting recommendations would be sufficient to ensure his appearance at future hearings or prevent him from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.

Issue

On appeal defendant argues that the State failed to prove that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably ensure defendant’s appearance at future hearings or prevent him from being charged with a subsequent felony or a Class A misdemeanor. 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022).

Section 110-6

Section 110-6 of the Code provides that, when a defendant has previously been granted pretrial release for a felony or a Class A misdemeanor, the release may be revoked following a hearing on the court’s own motion or the State’s verified petition only if the defendant is charged with a felony or a Class A misdemeanor alleged to have occurred during the defendant’s pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022). 

Section 110-6(a) further provides that, on a petition to revoke pretrial release, “[t]he State shall bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions of release would *** prevent the defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.” Id

Analysis

As to defendant’s second argument on conditions, the trial court reasonably concluded that no condition or combination of conditions would prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.

Defendant returned to 402 E. Illinois Avenue the day after being charged with criminal trespass and obstructing an officer for failing to leave the same property. The factual proffer was that the resident of the property, Denise, had a no-contact order against defendant, which defendant blatantly ignored. 

These facts demonstrate defendant’s disregard of court-imposed conditions.

Defendant was also charged with burglary involving possession of a gun locker key and entering a secure area at the Aurora Police Department. Moreover, defendant was unable to even abide instructions to control himself at the revocation hearing, resulting in his removal from the courtroom. Although his behavior seems likely owing to mental health issues, he has demonstrated that he would ignore court-imposed conditions and be charged with subsequent felonies and Class A misdemeanors, which is the salient consideration in this revocation order. 

Holding

For these reasons, the trial court’s finding on conditions was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and its decision to revoke defendant’s pretrial release was not an abuse of discretion.

We affirm the order of the Kane County circuit court revoking defendant’s pretrial release. ¶ 24 Affirmed. 

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People v. Tolliver, 2024 IL App (4th) 241131 (November). (72 hour rule begins when defendant is transported to your county.)

In Boone County case No. 18-CF-1, defendant is facing four criminal charges, including one count of being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2018)).

Facts

On December 12, 2022, defendant was released pending retrial on these charges by posting a $10,000 bond deposit on his then-existing bond of $100,000. 

After the Act took effect, defendant was “allowed to remain on pretrial release under the terms of [his] original bail bond,” but the State retained the “ability to file *** a petition for revocation *** under Section 110-6.” 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(a) (West 2022). This appeal involves such a petition. 

The record reflects the following timeline of events, all occurring in 2024: 

March 1 Defendant allegedly commits several felonies in Cook County. 

April 1 A Cook County grand jury issues a multiple-count indictment against defendant

April 16 The Boone County State’s Attorney’s Office files a petition to revoke defendant’s pretrial release based on the Cook County indictment. See 725 ILCS 5/110-10(a)(4) (West 2022) (providing that a condition of any bail bond is that the defendant “[n]ot violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction”). Based on the petition, a Boone County judge issues a warrant for defendant’s arrest under section 107-9 of the Code (id. § 107-9). See id. § 110-3(a) (allowing for an arrest warrant to issue based on an alleged failure to comply with a condition of pretrial release).

April 24 Defendant is arrested in Cook County and taken into custody. 

April 26 The Boone County State’s Attorney’s Office is officially notified of defendant’s arrest by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. 

April 29 The Boone County Sheriff’s Office picks defendant up from Cook County and takes him into custody. A return of service on the arrest warrant is filed in Boone County case No. 18-CF-1 showing that defendant was arrested on April 29, 2024. A revocation hearing is tentatively scheduled for May 1. However, defendant’s retained attorneys contact the Boone County State’s Attorney’s Office and say that they “will be on trial for the rest of this week and *** were wondering if [they] could set the PFA for Friday 5/3.”

May 1 After further e-mail correspondence with the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office and defendant’s attorneys, the trial court schedules the revocation hearing for May 3

May 2 Defendant’s attorneys file a petition seeking new, nonmonetary conditions of release under the Code. 

May 3 The revocation hearing is held, and the trial court revokes defendant’s pretrial release.

Section 109-2

This sections gives a county 5 days to transport defendant to their county for a detention hearing after a suspect has been arrested in another county.

If they don’t have the hearing the warrant shall be quashed and he shall be released with conditions. 

Key Finding

Here, it is clear that, within the five calendar days allowed by section 109-2(e)(2), defendant was transported to Boone County for a hearing under section 110-6, so a release from custody under section 109-2(f) would have been improper

72 Hour Clock: Section 110-6(a)

When a petition to revoke pretrial release has been fild after a new offense then the state has 72 hours to hold the revocation hearing.

Problem With The 72 Hour Rule

Strictly speaking, the State’s verified petition to revoke defendant’s pretrial release was “filed” on April 16, 2024. The same day, the trial court issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant was ultimately not arrested on that warrant until April 24, or eight days after the filing of the petition to revoke. If we agreed with defendant’s position on appeal, it would mean that the trial court should have proceeded to hear the State’s petition in absentia, with defendant being given no opportunity to participate in the hearing. This seems to contradict the goals of the statute, as reflected in other provisions. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022) (stating that, at the revocation hearing, the defendant shall “have an opportunity to be heard regarding the violation and evidence in mitigation”); id. § 110-6(c) (setting forth measures “to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court” and referencing the warrant provisions of section 110-3).

Analysis

The clear legislative purpose of providing defendant with a meaningful hearing on a petition to revoke pretrial release would be materially frustrated if the 72-hour requirement were read to require a hearing before defendant was brought back to the prosecuting jurisdiction.

Section 109-2(e)(2) of the Code expressly allowed the Boone County Sheriff’s Office five calendar days to transport defendant from Cook County for a hearing under section 110-6. Even if we were to hold, as defendant urges, that the 72-hour clock began to run with defendant’s arrest in Cook County, such an interpretation would effectively reduce those five calendar days to three. Furthermore, the state’s attorney does not have supervisory authority over the sheriff and should not be penalized if the sheriff fails to complete the transfer in 72 hours despite the state’s attorney’s attempts to diligently advance the process. 

Key Finding

To avoid this problem, we conclude that, after the State files its petition, the time for holding a revocation hearing does not begin to run until the sheriff has completed the transfer, which must be done within the maximum of five calendar days under the statute. 

This is effectively the reading of the statute adopted here by the trial court, and we see the wisdom in this approach. 

This harmonizes section 109-2(e)(2) with section 110-6(a), which provides that “[t]he defendant shall be transferred to the court before which the previous matter is pending without unnecessary delay, and the revocation hearing shall occur within 72 hours of the filing of the State’s petition.”

Furthermore, section 109-2(f) prescribes a specific consequence for the sheriff’s failure to transport the defendant for a hearing under either section 110-6 or 110- – 8 – 6.1, which establishes even shorter deadlines. See id. § 110-6.1(c)(2) (providing for a detention hearing within 24 to 48 hours). It is reasonable that any consequences flowing from the court’s failure to hold a timely hearing under section 110-6 should appear in section 110-6. ¶ 19 Accordingly, the trial court properly treated the State’s petition as filed on April 29, at which point the 72-hour clock started. 

Holding

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. ¶ 26 Affirmed.