People v. Delaney, 2024 IL App (5th) 240231 (May). Episode 1049 (Duration 19:58)

The residual forcible felony clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) does not require the State to prove defendant contemplated and was willing to use force sufficient to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement.

Defendant was charged with agg fleeing and eluding. The sole issue on appeal is whether the charged offense was a qualifying offense as defined in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). ¶ 15 The State contends that the trial court applied the wrong definition of “forcible felony” under the Act and that no evidence of defendant’s contemplation of the use of force should be required under the language of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). 

Section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) defines forcible felony for purposes of detainable offenses under the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). It specifically lists numerous felonies that are considered forcible felonies under the Act and also contains a residual clause that includes any felony “which involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” Id. 

The State argues that, while the trial court noted the difference between the residual clause in section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2022)) (forcible felony definition statute) and section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)) (section defining forcible felony for purpose of the Act) related to the required level of injury, the court failed to acknowledge that, unlike the residual clause in section 2-8, the Act’s forcible felony residual clause does not require the threat be particularized to a person or any individual. 

As such, the plain language of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) does not require a defendant to specifically contemplate injury to a particular person or make a threat targeting a particular person. 

Rather, section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) includes any felony that involves the threat of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement, in its general sense, to the community at large. 

It contends, if the legislature intended to limit the definition of a forcible felony to threats particularized to an individual, it would have stated such or drafted the section to state: “any other felony which involves a threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability.” 

As such, the court erred in requiring the State to prove defendant’s intent to injure. We agree.  

The language of the residual clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) plainly includes any other felony than those listed “which involves the threat *** of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” Id. 

The legislature did not include an intent element, a limitation that the threat be against a specific individual, or that defendant contemplated the threat of great bodily harm. We therefore cannot read those conditions into the statute. 

Defendant also asserts that, under the State’s interpretation, aggravated fleeing would automatically become a detainable offense because “[t]he threat of great bodily harm to the public [would] be established by the very nature of the offense, regardless of whether the defendant specifically contemplated a use of force in creating that threat.” Defendant argues such interpretation would lead to absurd results that were not intended by the legislature because the State could simply allege any felony offense may have the potential to involve the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement, through hypothetical examples of what could have happened, instead of what actually happened in a case. 

We disagree. Our interpretation would not require every felony or charge of aggravated fleeing to be considered a forcible felony. Rather, under our interpretation, a forcible felony occurs only when the circumstances of a particular case show that defendant’s actions actually threatened or inflicted great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement. 

Accordingly, we find the residual forcible felony clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) does not require the State to prove defendant contemplated and was willing to use force sufficient to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement. As such, we find the court misinterpreted the requirements of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). Given the court’s misunderstanding of the law, we reverse the court’s order granting pretrial release and remand for the court to hold a new hearing on the State’s amended verified petition to deny pretrial release in accordance with this disposition. 

The trial court erred in finding the residual forcible felony clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)) required the State to prove defendant contemplated and was willing to use force necessary to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order granting pretrial release and remand for the court to hold a new hearing on the State’s amended verified petition to deny pretrial release in accordance with this disposition. Reversed and remanded.

People v. Miller, 2024 IL App (1st) 240588 (May).  The witness and the victim started to walk away from the defendant “at which time the victim called the defendant a b***.” Defendant then walked up behind the victim struck him “one time in the left temple with a closed fist.” The victim fell backwards, and the back of his head struck the sidewalk. The entire incident was captured on surveillance video. The victim was taken to the hospital and “declared deceased.” 

The medical examiner determined the cause of death to be homicide from a “vertebral artery dissection.” The ASA explained that the vertebral artery is a “fragile artery in the skull/head area and can dissect with a sudden head movement. The dissection caused the blood flow to stop to the brain,” which caused the victim’s death. When questioned by the court, the ASA stated that he was not sure if the medical examiner was able to determine whether the vertebral artery dissection was caused by defendant’s strike or the victim’s fall. The ASA did not currently have the medical examiner’s report, and the ASA had not spoken with the medical examiner. Turning to defendant’s arguments on appeal, defendant first contends that the State failed to meet its burden of showing clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or presumption great that he committed the detainable offense of first degree murder. Defendant contends that his actions in punching the victim once do not support a conclusion that he knew those actions would create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. There is a long-standing general rule in Illinois that death is not ordinarily contemplated as a natural consequence of a blow or blows from a bare fist. In People v. Crenshaw, 298 Ill. 412, 414 (1921), our supreme court considered a case in which the defendant sought out the victim, told him that he would kill him, then struck the victim in the face with a clenched fist, knocking the victim down. The victim died shortly thereafter, as a result of the defendant’s blow. Id. Despite the defendant’s statement, the supreme court reversed his murder conviction, finding that “striking of a blow with the fist on the side of the face or head is not likely to be attended with dangerous or fatal consequences, and no inference of an intent to kill is warranted from the circumstances disclosed by the proof in this case.” Id. at 416-17; see People v. Mighell, 254 Ill. 53, 59 (1912) (reversing a defendant’s murder conviction where the defendant punched the victim in the neck with a bare fist, fracturing the base of the victim’s skull and causing a hemorrhage in the victim’s carotid artery: “[T]he defendant was guilty of no more than manslaughter, and he should not, therefore, have been convicted of murder. *** There is not the slightest reason *** to suppose that he contemplated the [deceased’s] death or even any serious injury to him.”). Since that time, courts in this state have repeatedly confirmed the general rule that death is not ordinarily contemplated as a natural consequence of blows from a bare fist. People v. Gresham, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1007 (1979) (“death is not a reasonable or probable consequence of a blow No. 1-24-0588B 15 with a bare fist”); People v. Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 34 (reversing a defendant’s second degree murder conviction where the defendant punched the victim once or twice in the face with a bare fist); People v. Yeoman, 2016 IL App (3d) 140324, ¶ 22 (“[T]here is no dispute in this case that defendant struck [the victim] only one time in the face with his bare fist. That conduct alone is not the type of conduct that would generally create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim. [Citation.] Defendant, therefore, could not have knowledge that such a result was practically certain to occur.”). Illinois courts have, however, recognized some exceptions to that general principle. In particular, in People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 451-52 (1984), our supreme court affirmed the murder conviction of an adult defendant for the beating death of a four-year-old child, recognizing that a blow from a bare fist could result in murder where there was a great disparity in size and strength between the defendant and the victim. See People v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170, 180-81 (1987) (affirming the murder conviction of a 21-year-old defendant for the barehanded beating death of an 85-year-old woman); People v. Drumheller, 15 Ill. App. 3d 418, 421 (1973) (affirming the murder conviction of an adult defendant in the beating death of a 14-month-old infant). Another exception to the general rule has been applied where the defendant inflicted multiple blows to the victim. See People v. Rodgers, 254 Ill. App. 3d 148, 151-54 (1993), vacated on other grounds, 156 Ill. 2d 564 (1994) (supervisory order), readopted in pertinent part, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1, 2 (1994) (affirming the defendant’s murder conviction where the defendant punched the victim in the head numerous times while the victim was sleeping). The findings made by the trial court to support its conclusion that the proof was evident or presumption great that defendant committed the offense do not suggest that defendant possessed the requisite mens rea to support a first degree murder charge. Specifically, the court wrote only No. 1-24-0588B 16 that “defendant followed the victim, after words were exchanged, and punched victim once; the artery to the brain was damaged which resulted in lack of blood flow to the brain.” Without more, such findings do not indicate how defendant could have known that his single bare fisted punch would have caused death or great bodily harm to the victim, to support a conviction for first degree murder. The facts proffered to the court established that defendant struck the victim with his bare fist once and not multiple times. And, the facts showed that defendant and the victim were aged, respectively, 29 and 47—far from the type of significant age gap that would suggest, without further information, that there was a size or strength discrepancy like those which have implicated the exception in other cases. See Ward, 101 Ill. 2d at 446-52 (adult defendant and a four-year-old victim); Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 180-81 (21-year-old defendant and 85-year-old victim); Drumheller, 15 Ill. App. 3d at 421 (adult defendant and 14-month-old infant victim). Where, however, this court has expressed doubt about the propriety of a first degree murder charge under the proffered facts, we find the State’s argument that he is dangerous simply because he has been charged with that offense, to be unpersuasive.  We also observe that the State does not argue that any other factor weighs in favor of finding him dangerous. Indeed, defendant does not have a criminal history “indicative of violent *** behavior,” he was not on probation, parole, or any other type of release at the time of the offense, there no evidence that he “possesses or has access to weapons,” and there is no other evidence showing that defendant has a “propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior.” we remand this matter to the trial court to consider whether defendant should be entitled to pretrial release in light of the law described above. ¶ 54 For the foregoing reasons, this matter is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶ 55 Reversed and remanded 

People v. Brooks, 2024 IL App (4th) 240503 (May). Charged with mob action and aggravated battery for jumping victim in JC Penny parking lot. The State also proffered that defendant was “just released” from custody the previous week in connection with Fulton County case No. 23-CF-187, wherein he was charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse and criminal sexual abuse. The State asserted defendant had pleaded guilty in that case and was “released for the purpose of getting a [Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB)] evaluation.”  In summarizing its reasons for detention pursuant to section 110-6.1(h)(1) of the Code (id. § 110-6.1(h)(1)), the court stated its decision was based on the following: “the nature of the allegations[,] the injuries to the alleged victim[,] the possible punishments for defendant, as well as the other pending cases [sic] *** and the short timing from his prior release from custody and current incarceration.” On appeal, defendant has filed a Rule 604(h) memorandum, arguing he was not eligible for pretrial detention because the State did not charge him with a detainable offense under the Code. In particular, he argues that aggravated battery is only a detainable offense when it is alleged to have resulted “in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). Clearly, for a defendant to be denied release under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5), he or she must be charged with a forcible felony, i.e., an offense specifically listed in that section or “any other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm.” Id. 

Under the circumstances presented, we agree with defendant that his aggravated battery charge was not a detainable offense under the Code. Significantly, however, defendant ignores that he was also charged in the present case with mob action as a Class 4 felony offense (720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(2), (b)(3) (West 2022)). 

Although not explicitly listed in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) as a forcible felony, defendant’s mob action charge is an “other felony” offense that may fall within the language of the residual clause of that section so long as it also involved “the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). 

Evidence showed that as a result of the attack, Hoyle had “multiple teeth [that were] broken or missing” and was diagnosed with a concussion. We note “Illinois law recognizes ‘that a physical beating may qualify as such conduct that could cause great bodily harm.’ ” People v. Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650, ¶ 70 (quoting People v. Costello, 95 Ill. App. 3d 680, 684 (1981), and citing People v. LopezBonilla, 2011 IL App (2d) 100688, ¶ 18). 

We find the trial court could have relied on such specific facts and details to find defendant’s felony mob action charge “involve[d] the *** infliction of great bodily harm.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). Such a determination would not be arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 10. 

 Accordingly, defendant cannot establish that reversal of the trial court’s detention order is warranted, based on either the occurrence of plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.

People v. Chaney, 2024 IL App (2d) 230563 (May). Accordingly, while defendant’s motions were clearly drafted in a manner consistent with the old schema, we construe defendant’s motions as motions brought pursuant to section 110- 7.5(b) of the Code. However, we reject defendant’s contention that section 110-7.5(b) entitles defendant to a new hearing under section 110-6.1 of the Code. Section 7.5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5 (West 2022)) addresses those persons who were arrested prior to the effective date of the amendments to the Code, dividing them into three categories.  

In the case of No. 18-CF-510, defendant was held without bond and would be entitled to a hearing under section 110-7.5(b)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b)(1) (West 2022)). Specifically, he is entitled to a hearing on his “motion for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions,” not a new hearing under section 110-6.1. 

Had the legislature intended that defendants should receive a new hearing under section 110-6.1, it could have indicated as such, just as it indicated in the immediately preceding sentence that defendants who remain in custody after having been ordered released with pretrial conditions are entitled to a hearing under section 110- 5(e). 

Our conclusion that defendant is not entitled to a section 110-6.1 hearing in No. 18-CF510 is bolstered when one considers which defendants were eligible to be held without bail prior to the amendments to the Code. Under the prior statutory schema, broadly speaking, a defendant could be held without bail only where (1) the proof was evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a qualifying offense and posed a real and present threat to the physical safety of a person or persons (725 ILCS 5/110-4, 110-6.1, 110-6.3 (West 2020)) or (2) where the defendant had committed additional crimes while released on bail or otherwise violated the conditions of bail (id. § 110-6).  These categories align with the two means by which a defendant can be held without pretrial release under the new schema: by denying pretrial release under section 110-6.1 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)) or by revoking pretrial release under section 110-6 (id. § 110-6). 

It would be unreasonable to read section 110-7.5(b) of the Code as automatically prescribing a hearing under section 110-6.1 when a defendant may have been held without bail not due to a finding of dangerousness or flight risk but instead due to revocation of pretrial release upon violation of conditions of release. See Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 39 (“[C]ourts do have an obligation to construe statutes in a way that will avoid absurd, unreasonable, or unjust results ***.”). 

In short, the nature of the order or orders to be reconsidered will determine the hearing a defendant receives pursuant to section 110-7.5(b)(1).  Accordingly, when a defendant seeks reconsideration of pretrial release conditions under section 110-7.5(b)(1), the proceedings may focus on either or both section 110-6 and section 110- 6.1, depending on the circumstances of the individual case and the original basis for holding the defendant without bail. 

Further, because such a motion seeks reconsideration rather than a new hearing, additional evidence or findings by the trial court may not be necessary if the original evidence and findings under the old schema would satisfy the requirements of the new schema. With that being said, should the trial court deny a defendant’s motion, as occurred here, the trial court should be explicit about which section of the new schema defendant is now being held under and the basis for the detention. 

This is important because defendants have different rights depending on whether they are being held under section 110-6 or section 110-6.1 of the Code. 

For instance, where the trial court revokes pretrial release under section 110-6 for a defendant with more than one case pending and either the case that caused the revocation is dismissed, the defendant is found not guilty, or the defendant completes a lawfully imposed sentence, the defendant is then entitled to a hearing on conditions of pretrial release under section 110-5 on the defendant’s other case (725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022); however, a defendant who is held pursuant to section 110-6.1(e) is entitled to pretrial release after 90 days (see id. § 110-6(i). 

Additionally, both sections require that the trial court make continuing findings at subsequent appearances as to whether the defendant’s detention is necessary, but those findings are specific to the relevant section. Id. §§ 110-6(j), 110-6.1(i-5). 

Further, a defendant is entitled to appeal an order of pretrial detention under either section, and they should know which section they are being detained under in order to make an effective appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).  

Here, the trial court’s order failed to specify what section defendant was being detained under or the basis for the detention. This was error. Because we do not know the basis for the trial court’s decision, we vacate the order denying defendant’s motion to reconsider in No. 18-CF-510 and remand for a new hearing. We affirm the De Kalb County circuit court’s order in case No. 23-CF-48, vacate the order in case No. 18-CF-510, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶ 27 Affirmed in part and vacated in part. ¶ 28 Cause remanded.  

People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479 (May). Defendant was arrested on December 5, 2023, and charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle and being an armed habitual criminal. On December 6, 2023, the trial court granted the State’s petition for pretrial detention premised upon the armed habitual criminal count. 

At the time of his arrest, defendant was on parole for a conviction for unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon. The trial court concluded that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat posed by defendant. It reasoned that defendant’s parole status and the fact that he was employed and supporting his pregnant girlfriend and her daughter were not sufficient to keep him from committing an offense. We affirmed that decision. People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 232454-U, ¶ 2. Defendant’s parole term ended on February 16, 2024, at which time he petitioned the trial court for his release, invoking section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code, which requires the trial court to determine if continued detention is necessary at each and every court date. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i5) (West 2022). The trial court held a hearing the same day and both parties provided a factual proffer. A search of the vehicle yielded a 9-millimeter handgun loaded with live ammunition and a defaced serial number and a .22-caliber handgun with an “auto switch” attached to it, as well as a 40-round drum magazine.  The Code, however, prescribes a different standard once the trial court has held a pretrial detention hearing and ordered the detention of a defendant. At each subsequent court date, the trial court must make a finding that “continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” 

While the section 110-6.1(i-5) finding shares commonalities with the State’s burden at a detention hearing, it is not identical. Rather than ask whether pretrial conditions can mitigate the threat posed by a defendant, it starts from the premise that detention was necessary to guard against that threat and asks whether anything has changed such that a defendant’s detention is no longer warranted. Id. 

The conclusion that follows is that the finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5) is simply a less demanding standard than what is required at a detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question. 

Thus, when the trial court found that the State presented clear and convincing evidence on all three elements required by section 110-6.1(e), that finding necessarily encompassed the continued detention finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5).  Accordingly, we answer the question of whether, pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5), defendant’s continued detention was necessary Defendant has multiple convictions for UUW by a felon. 

For more than a decade, defendant’s felony convictions have prohibited him from legally possessing firearms. That fact has not deterred him from repeatedly doing so. Defendant was on parole for his last UUW by a felon conviction when he was again arrested and charged with a gun offense—and with stealing a motor vehicle that resulted in a crash. This was done despite his claims that his pregnant girlfriend relied on his income to support their family. The only thing that changed between defendant’s initial detention hearing and his petition for release was that he was discharged from his parole term. But as the trial court rightly pointed out, the discharge of his parole did not change the fact that defendant was arrested while under the scrutiny of parole for his previous conviction. ¶ 18 It was not arbitrary or unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that continued detention was necessary when defendant has a lengthy history of disregarding rules and restrictions placed upon him.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

People v. Harris, 2024 IL App (2d) 240070 (May). The State charged defendant with one count of residential burglary – defednat forced his way into victim’s home and took cannabis and vodka – victiim was 70 yoa – victim fell but had no visible injuries – after initial hearing to detain  Defendant responded to the trial court’s decision by stating aloud, “I’m not going to trial on this shit. F***ing liars. You’re white liars, you know. Crackers, man. You’re liars.” the State proffered a statement from defendant’sinterview with the police during which he stated, “[i]f I go to jail or prison, his ass dead, because you killed him, you know you did, you murderer mother f***.” The trial court entered a written order dated January 24, 2024, for defendant’s EHM program and a separate order of the same date delineating defendant’s pretrial release conditions. The pretrial release conditions order required defendant to comply with the maximum conditions of supervised release and prohibited any contact with Kluber or Kluber’s residence. In addition, the order required defendant to stay with his mother in Aurora, follow EHM rules, and submit random urine testing for alcohol. Another order entered the following day stated that, “[a]fter arguments from both parties regarding defense’s request for reassessment of the defendant’s detention, the court finds that there is no dangerousness to the specific victim and the defendant is to be released on EHM & terms of conditions.” To the contrary, if the court determines that a defendant should be placed on pretrial release, section 110-5 of the Code does not contain an explicit requirement that the court make written findings or enter an order explaining the court’s reasons for placing a defendant on pretrial release. Id. § 110-5. Section 110-5 provides certain mandatory considerations for determining conditions of pretrial release, but does not require written findings except when the court “imposes electronic monitoring, GPS monitoring, or home confinement.” Id. § 110-5(h). In such instances, the court “shall set forth in the record the basis for its finding.” Id. The dispute on 2024 IL App (2d) 240070 18 appeal centers on the trial court’s determination that defendant was not dangerous and setting conditions of release at his subsequent appearance. Although this question was not identified by either party in their memoranda, this case presents the question of what is required under the Act in determining and ordering a defendant’s release from previously ordered pretrial detention at a subsequent appearance. Section 110-6.1(i5) addresses proceedings that occur after the trial court has issued a pretrial detention order pursuant to section 110-6.1(a) and (h) of the Code, which occurred here. Id. § 110-6.1(a), (h), (i5). Section 110-6.1(i-5) states that “[a]t each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). Thus, whether on motion of a party, on the court’s own motion, or merely on subsequent appearance of a defendant in court, a trial court must conduct some review of the appropriateness of a defendant’s continued detention each time a defendant appears. People v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13; People v. Long, 2023 IL App (5th) 230881, ¶¶ 18-19; People v. Stokes, 2024 IL App (1st) 232022-U, ¶ 29. At each such appearance or hearing, a court ordering continued pretrial detention must make certain findings based on specific, articulable facts, just as at an initial detention hearing. Id. However, subsequent determinations are not subject to every statutory requirement that applies to initial detention hearings. See Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13 (“the Code does not require the court to again make specific findings that the State proved the three propositions by clear and convincing evidence as required at the initial hearing”). The Stokes court, however, also noted that “only where a verified petition to deny pretrial release is before the court does the Code mandate a comprehensive pretrial hearing.” Id. ¶ 36. While the State must in some way provide a factual basis for continued detention, the State is not required by section 110-6.1(i-5) to repeatedly prove by clear and convincing evidence at subsequent appearances that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to any person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this threat or risk of flight. See Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13. Accordingly, in subsequent appearances following a detention hearing on the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release, section 110- 6.1(i-5) merely requires the trial court to find that “ ‘continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.’ ” Id. (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022)). Thus, while the trial court herein was required to make a finding at the January 24 subsequent appearance as to whether defendant’s continued detention was “necessary to avoid a real and present threat” under section 110-6.1(i-5), we need not consider whether the State proved each of the three propositions under section 110-6.1(e) by clear and convincing evidence. Instead, we consider only whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant pretrial release on reassessment after it had previously determined pretrial detention was necessary. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). Finally, section 110-5(h) states that “[i]f the court imposes electronic monitoring, GPS monitoring, or home confinement, the court shall set forth in the record the basis for its finding.” Id. § 110-5(h). The plain and ordinary language of section 110-5(a) of the Code requires the trial court to determine “which conditions of pretrial release, if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release” by taking into account various “matters” based on “available information.” (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). Thus, whether at an initial pretrial detention hearing or at a subsequent appearance, a court may determine that no conditions will reasonably ensure one or more of the three considerations listed (appearance, safety, and compliance). If a court makes such a determination and orders detention, it must make findings consistent with section 110-6.1(h)(1). Id. § 110- 6(h)(1). 

However, if a court determines that a defendant should be released, no written findings are required. Section 110-5(a) provides only that a court determining pretrial release conditions “take into account such matters as” those delineated in subsection (a). Id. § 110-5(a)(1)-(7). 

Contrast this release determination standard with that for a detention order, in which the court shall “make a written finding summarizing the court’s reasons *** based on the specific articulable facts of the case.” Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1). Clearly, the Act requires greater specificity in a trial court’s factual findings to support a determination to detain than for one to release. 

However, even when a court determines that a defendant should be released before trial, the pretrial conditions of release must comply with the Code. For example, if a court releases a defendant on electronic monitoring, GPS monitoring, or home confinement, such conditions can only be imposed when “no less restrictive condition of release or combination of less restrictive condition[s] of release would reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant for later hearings or protect an identifiable person or persons from imminent threat of serious physical harm.” Id. § 110-5(g). 

To justify its decision in such instances, the court must “set forth in the record the basis for its finding.” Id. § 110-5(h). With these statutory considerations in mind, we turn to the trial court’s decision to release defendant from continued pretrial detention in this case. Id. § 110-6.1(i-5). We are unable to discern, on this record, whether and to what extent the trial court took into account the matters listed in section 110-5(a) of the Code when deciding to grant defendant pretrial release. In its cursory oral ruling, the court apparently placed great weight on defendant’s presentation of alibi evidence, particularly the Metra ticket and argument concerning the identification of defendant by name. The court stated that this supported a conclusion that defendant was not a danger to Kluber, but the existence of alibi evidence would go to “the weight of the evidence against the defendant” (725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(2) (West 2022)), not to “the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat” under section 110-5(a)(4) (725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(4) (West 2022)). Further, the court did not articulate any information relevant to subsection 3, concerning the history and characteristics of defendant, including various aspects of his physical, mental and financial condition, as well as criminal history and whether he was on release for any offense. Id. § 110-5(a)(3). Defendant also had a lengthy criminal history, but the majority of his cases involved trespass to land, which the court arguably could have found was attendant to defendant’s unhoused living condition. However, the record contains none of the court’s observations or conclusions on this set of matters that “shall” be taken into account. Id. § 110-5(a). 

We hold that when determining pretrial release of a defendant, the trial court must provide a record of its findings, articulating how it took into account matters delineated in section 110-5(a) of the Code. Id. § 110-5(a). Here, the trial court did not explain on the record how it took into account matters in which it determined the conditions of defendant’s pretrial release pursuant to section 110-5(a). Id. We also find that the trial court did not comply with section 110-5(h) of the Code, which specifically requires the court to “set forth in the record the basis for its finding” to impose EHM. Id. § 110-5(h). 

For these reasons, we must vacate the trial court’s January 24, 2024 order granting defendant pretrial release with maximum conditions under EHM and remand for compliance with section 110-5(h) of the Code, which requires the court to set forth the basis for its finding to impose EHM. Id. ). In the interim, defendant shall remain on pretrial release with conditions as set forth in the trial court’s January 24, 2024 order. ¶ 58 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 59 For the reasons stated, we vacate the order of the circuit court of Kane County, and the cause is remanded for the court to comply with the Code when granting pretrial release and imposing electronic home monitoring as a condition of release. Id. §§ 110-5(a), (h), 6.1(i-5). ¶ 60 Order vacated; cause remanded. 

People v. Romine, 2024 IL App (4th) 240321 (May). . Defendant argues that the court erred in detaining him pending trial for killing his mother, we affirm. This court has not yet addressed when, if ever, a defendant’s assertion of an affirmative defense before trial can affect the State’s burden of proof on the first element at a detention hearing. r, defendant focuses on his claim of self-defense as it pertains to the elements of dangerousness and conditions of release, so we will do the same. Defendant argues that the State failed to establish his dangerousness because, although he shot his mother, “[t]here is no evidence or even a theory that he poses a threat to any other person or the community at large.” Defendant then cites People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18, for the proposition that “bare allegations that [the] defendant has committed a violent offense are not sufficient to establish th[e] element” “that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat posed by [the] defendant” (id. ¶ 17 (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022))).  In Stock, the State relied only upon “a conclusory statement” with “no evidence to support that conclusion” and “at no point referenced or discussed *** conditions or section 110-10(b) of the Code.” Id. The appellate court concluded that, “[i]f the base allegations that make up the sine qua non of a violent offense were sufficient on their own to establish this element, then the legislature would have simply deemed those accused of violent offenses ineligible for release.” Id. ¶ 18. We agree with Stock to the extent that it held a bare consideration of the defendant’s dangerousness, with absolutely no consideration of possible conditions of release, cannot justify pretrial detention under the Act’s three-element framework. People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 18 (“[T]he fact that a person is charged with a detainable offense is not enough to order detention, nor is it enough that the defendant poses a threat to public safety.”). However, defendant appears to believe that a single violent offense can never justify pretrial detention when “it was not the result of a pattern of abuse or criminal behavior.” In making this argument, defendant is subtly attempting to extend the express holding of Stock, in which the appellate court found no error in the trial court’s consideration of the dangerousness element but reversed based on the trial court’s consideration of the third element: conditions of release. See Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶¶ 14-15 (“Defendant’s behavior as alleged, at a bare minimum, was dangerous, and such behavior poses a threat to those around him even if he did not intend any harm.”). Of course, dangerousness and conditions of release are two sides of the same coin; the nature and severity of the threat necessarily determine the nature and severity of the conditions that could—or could not— mitigate the threat. Compare 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022) (listing considerations for determining dangerousness), with id. § 110-5(a) (listing similar considerations for determining conditions of release). In this sense, defendant’s argument has at least some basis in Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18 (“This is not to say that alleged facts stating the basic elements of an offense are – 5 – not relevant or are not part of the proof that no conditions could mitigate the threat posed by a defendant. But more is required.”). Here again, we agree with the proposition that “more is required” only to an extent; an untried indictment or other charging instrument triggers the State’s right to file a verified petition to deny pretrial release but has a different purpose altogether; it needs only to present the most bare and conclusory facts necessary to state an offense. The full picture of the underlying events, however, may be relevant to the trial court’s detention decision. However, the trial court does not simply review the charging instrument when determining whether to detain the defendant on dangerousness grounds; indeed, the trial court must go beyond these bare allegations to address “the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022). In doing so, the court may consider “evidence or testimony concerning *** [t]he nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence” (id. § 110-6.1(g)(1)), although the trial court’s decision cannot be based exclusively on this or any other single factor (see id. § 110-6.1(f)(7); People v. Bond, 2024 IL App (2d) 230536-U, ¶¶ 13, 18 (reversing a detention order when, “beyond the nature of the offenses themselves, the State presented nothing to show that no set of conditions would mitigate the threat to the victim defendant’s release would present”)). Nevertheless, the evidence the court uses to determine the nature and circumstances of the offense may also shed light on the other statutory factors governing dangerousness and conditions of release, including those the trial court relied on here: defendant’s personal history, statements attributed to him, the age and physical condition of his mother, and his access to firearms. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(2), (4), (6)-(7); see also id. § 110-5(a) (providing that a determination regarding conditions of release shall be made “on the basis of available information”). This same evidence would not be less probative on the question of pretrial detention even if it provided the sole basis for the allegations in the charging instrument. Ultimately, the evidence of a defendant’s charged conduct, even if it took place on a single occasion, may reflect such a departure from the basic expectations of civil society that it becomes difficult to predict the defendant’s compliance with court orders—or even societal norms regarding the safety of others—if the defendant is placed on pretrial release. The presumption in favor of pretrial release under the Act does not obligate a trial court to release such a defendant in the hopes that his otherwise spotless record will negate the real and present threat he poses to the safety of the community as shown by the State’s evidence. In the present case, defendant does not dispute that he shot his mother, but he claims that he acted in self-defense because she was approaching him with a knife and had already cut his arm once. While we agree that his proffered evidence on this point was potentially relevant to – 6 – his alleged dangerousness, as well as the question of whether that alleged danger could be mitigated by conditions of release, his focus on this evidence is myopic. The evidence of his subsequent conduct, which the trial court properly considered in reaching its decision, paints a different picture and undermines this characterization of defendant’s conduct. See id. § 110- 6.1(g)(1) (providing that the trial court may consider the “nature and circumstances of any offense charged” (emphasis added)). The court was not required to accept defendant’s contention that he acted in self-defense when the record permitted other conclusions concerning his culpability and, by extension, his potential dangerousness. It is unclear from the record whether prompt medical intervention might have saved his mother’s life, but it is evident that defendant abandoned her body rather than calling the authorities to explain the situation, preserve evidence to support his claim of self-defense, and have his mother properly laid to rest. Even if defendant was uncertain about the right thing to do, he could have called one of his many police contacts to ask, as he later did when he wanted to determine what to do with his loaded rifle. Instead, when the police called him after he left the house, he lied and said that his mother was alive and well, and then he attempted to destroy his phone. Had the officers not investigated further, her death would have gone undiscovered even longer. When police cars pursued defendant with their lights and sirens on, he refused to pull over and ran red lights, and after the police arrested him, he lied again and said that a burglar named “John” had likely killed his mother. Defendant’s actions are not consistent with an innocent mistake or genuine remorse but a concerted refusal to accept responsibility for conduct he knew was wrong. Defendants on pretrial release are expected not just to comply with the terms of their release but to be forthright about their efforts to comply and to accept responsibility for violations, even if they believe those violations were innocent mistakes. In light of defendant’s repeated efforts to escape responsibility for what he only now claims was an act of self-defense, the trial court’s conclusion that no conditions of release could avoid the real and present threat defendant posed to the safety of the community was within the bounds of reason. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant detained on dangerousness grounds For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.  Affirmed. 

People v. Carpenter, 2024 IL App (1st) 240037 (May). Predatory, victim 5 years old his DNA was in her underwear. The nature and circumstances of the offense charged is the prime consideration in determining the conditions of release, if any (id. § 110-5(a)(1)), and in denying pretrial release (id. § 110-6.1(a)), including in making the dangerousness determination (id. § 110-6.1(g)(1)). To be sure, there are a great many pretrial detention cases in which other statutory factors such as a defendant’s criminal history, access to weapons, or parole status (id. § 110-6.1(g)(2), (7), (8)) may inform the circuit court’s dangerousness determination, but those factors are not required. They merely exemplify the types of factors that the circuit court can consider, and the Code makes clear the list is not exhaustive because the circuit court can consider any factor “deemed by the court to have a reasonable bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior” Id. § 110-6.1(g)(9). To conclude otherwise would mean that a true first offender—regardless of how heinous the offense charged or the obvious danger presented—could never be detained pretrial, because in such a case, the only evidence available would consist of the nature and circumstances of the crime charged. There is nothing in the text of the Code to suggest that the General Assembly intended such an absurd result. To that extent, Stock is correct: a generic rendition of the elements of the crime charged is inadequate because it is not individualized. But there is nothing in the Code that suggests that a proffer made with grisly detail cannot satisfy “the specific articulable facts of the case” requirement simply because the facts proffered are coextensive with the elements of the offense charged. Turning back to the offense charged here, not all predatory sexual assaults of a child are created equal. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a) (West 2022). All are terrible, but some are far worse than others, and this is reflected in a sentencing range of “not less than 6 years and not more than 60 No. 1-24-0037B – 9 – years.” Id. § 11-1.40(b)(1).  Likewise, pretrial detention determinations in such cases may also vary significantly. The “specific articulable facts of the case” make all the difference. Here in finding that less restrictive conditions would be inadequate to mitigate the threat posed by defendant if released, the circuit court noted that the victim was “a very young child”—a particularly vulnerable subset of the community needing protection. Further, defendant’s access to the child was limited: he was “briefly left alone” and seemingly committed the offense even with limited opportunity. These proffered facts amply demonstrate why less restrictive conditions of release, such as curfew, home confinement, or electronic monitoring, would be inadequate to protect against the threat posed by this defendant; in the words of the circuit court, “there is no way to guarantee that he will not come into contact with other children if released.” The Code requires no further explanation “why.” 

People v. Challans, 2024 IL App (5th) 240353 (May). the defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated assault, a Class A misdemeanor, victim was his father. While at the police department, the defendant screamed and threatened to kill James to get his money. The defendant specifically threatened that he would kill James with a knife if he had to. The State noted that the defendant had been involuntarily committed twice for a mental health evaluation after displaying deeply concerning behavior, which officers described as “manic with delusional thoughts of rage and harm.” The defendant was ordered detained. On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court’s March 5, 2024, order should be reversed because the charged offense in this case was not detainable under section 110-6.1(a). The Code allows the circuit court to detain the defendant if “the defendant is charged with an attempt to commit any charge listed in paragraphs (1) through (6.5), and it is alleged that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(7). Aggravated assault is not included in the vast list of detainable offenses contained in the Code. The language of the Code requires that the defendant “is charged with” with a detainable offense or an attempt of a detainable offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022). The legislature did not include language that allows for the possibility of a charge, e.g., “could be charged with.” We cannot read any additional, permissible language into the Code.  The State suggests that the defendant is eligible for detention because he could have been charged with attempted aggravated stalking or attempted domestic battery, which are charges listed in paragraphs (2) and (4) respectively, and the defendant’s dangerousness warrants detention. See also (7) covering attempts of the listed charges. However, in this case, the defendant was not charged with either offense, but rather was charged with aggravated assault. As a result, the court erred when it detained the defendant because the offense as charged is not a detainable offense. Reversed and remanded with directions. 

People v. Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 240154 (May). Charge was AUUW Felon, he was on parole at the time and was detained. Johnson’s lone claim on appeal is that the State did not demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that he posed a real and present threat to a person, persons, or the community, just because he had a gun. The court further explained in its written order that “[d]efendant possessing a loaded firearm on his person while on parole for a serious and violent offense suggests that his release poses a danger to the community.” Possession of the firearm disregards the conditions of his release. A person who acts with such disregard could reasonably be found to place the public at risk, even where, as here, that person was not arrested while actively using the firearm. See People v. Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 29 (noting the public policy in Illinois that the public health and welfare is furthered by identifying individuals who should not have firearms (citing 430 ILCS 65/1 (West 2022))); see also People v. Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶¶ 74-77 (circuit court did not err in finding a defendant with a criminal history posed a danger due to possession of a firearm where, in part, the defendant was already barred from possessing a firearm and demonstrated noncompliance with court orders).  The State’s proffer showed that Johnson, at the time of his arrest, was on parole after an armed robbery with a firearm conviction and currently had access to firearms. Each aspect of Johnson’s conduct—his parole status, his access to firearms, and his violent criminal history—are relevant factors to a court’s detention determination. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(2)(A), (7), (8).  These arguments fail No. 1-24-0154B 7 because they ignore the guidance from cases like Lee and Parker, where those courts acknowledged the danger of firearm possession under any circumstances by an individual legally barred from doing so. See Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 29 (citing 430 ILCS 65/1 (West 2022)); Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶¶ 74-77. Johnson’s willingness to use a firearm in the commission of a violent crime, coupled with his subsequent inability to refrain from committing a new firearm violation following his conditional release for that violent crime, provides more than a sufficient record to sustain the circuit court’s pretrial detention finding.  Hence, we affirm.