In re B.G., 2017 IL App (3d) 170144 (July). Episode 407 (Duration 5:24)
Defendant’s right to petition to end his sex offender registration was not terminated by his new offense.
Defendant originally was adjudicated delinquent for a sexual crime (an offense that would have been charged as a Class 1 felony if B.G. was an adult).
As an adult he was charged and convicted of failure to register as a sex offender.
Later, he tried to file a motion to end his registration requirement but the motion was dismissed.
The issue here is at what point in time can an individual, who has been subject to additional registration requirements under section 7 of the Act, file a petition to terminate sex offender registration, under section 3-5 of the Act?
Right To Petition
At the time of the adjudication 3-5 did not exist, but it applies retroactively (730 ILCS 150/3-5(h)).
Section 3-5 specifies the rights and obligations of juvenile delinquents who are subject to the Act. 730 ILCS 150/3-5. Section 3-5 is intended “to protect the rights of juvenile delinquents, who have a greater likelihood of rehabilitation, by allowing them the opportunity to petition the court to remove them from the sex offender registry.” 730 ILCS 150/3-5(c).
Subsection 3-5(c) states:
“For a minor adjudicated delinquent for an offense which, if charged as an adult, would be a felony, no less than 5 years after registration ordered pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section, the minor may petition for the termination of the term of registration.”
At the time of his 2016 petition, B.G. had satisfied each of the subsection 3-5(c) requirements.
Specifically, the original adjudication statutorily classified B.G. as a “sex offender” as defined in subsection 2(A)(5). 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5), 3-5(a). B.G. was originally required to register as a sex offender for a 10-year period. See 730 ILCS 150/2, 3, and 7.
Thus, under subsection 3-5(c), B.G. was eligible to petition for termination in 2009. 730 ILCS 150/3-5(c).
The Subsequent Conviction
While B.G. did not seek termination at that time, he was convicted in 2013 of failing to register as a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/10(a)).
Section 7 states:
“The Director of State Police, consistent with administrative rules, shall extend for 10 years the registration period of any sex offender, as defined in Section 2 of this Act, who fails to comply with the provisions of this Article. The registration period for any sex offender who fails to comply with any provision of the Act shall extend the period of registration by 10 years beginning from the first date of registration after the violation.”
By its plain language, section 7 does not create a new registration period but extends the underlying registration term by 10 years.
Specifically, section 7 empowers the Director of State Police to “extend” the registration period. It does not authorize the director to order a new registration period.
The court said this plain language to means that a juvenile registrant may file a section 3-5 petition to terminate registration five years or more after the original order was entered under subsection 3-5(a), even if the registration period was extended under section 7.
This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the legislature’s intent “to protect the rights of juvenile delinquents, who have a greater likelihood of rehabilitation.”
At the time B.G. filed his petition, he had been subject to registration for more than 12 years due to the 2004 registration order (730 ILCS 150/3) and the 2013 extension (730 ILCS 150/7).
Because more than five years elapsed from the 2004 order, B.G. had the right, under section 3-5(c), to file a petition to terminate registration in 2016. 730 ILCS 150/3-5(c).
Therefore, the court erred in dismissing B.G.’s petition.