People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (3d) 140235 (June). Episode 205 (Duration 7:12)
Conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse is reversed to speedy trial violation.
Speedy Trial Right
Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution guarantee the right to a speedy trial for anyone accused of a crime. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. The Illinois speedy trial statute enforces this constitutional right, and its protections are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant.
Defendant contends that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial as:
(1) he was served with a Peoria County arrest warrant in this case while he was awaiting trial in Sangamon County on another charge (he was convicted of this different aggravated criminal sexual abuse case)
(2) he was held in the Sangamon County jail for 31 days after he was sentenced on the Sangamon County case (7 years IDOC); and
(3) over 120 days passed from the termination of proceedings in Sangamon County to the date he filed his motion to dismiss.
The court had to analyze if defendant was “in custody” on the Peoria charge while he was sitting in jail in Sangamon County on a different charge?
Illinois Speedy Trial Statute
725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) of the speedy trial statute states,
“Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant ***.”
The IDA (Illinois Detainer Act -730 ILCS 5/3-8-10) further applies the 160-day time period and trial demand requirement to “persons committed to any institution or facility or program of the [DOC] who have untried complaints, charges or indictments pending in any county of this State.”
The terms custody and commitment are both terms which have commonly been used interchangeably to characterize actual imprisonment, or incarceration, or confinement. See People v. Mikrut, 117 Ill. App. 2d 444, 448 (1969).
As defendant was not actually imprisoned, incarcerated, or confined by the DOC at the time that the proceedings in Sangamon County were terminated, defendant was not in the custody of the DOC, and the IDA does not apply.
Defendant was, thus, always under a 120-day speedy trial clock.
Further, this clock does not begin to run until the proceedings in the first county end and defendant is held in custody by or for the second county on the subject charges.
A defendant is not in the custody of the second county until the first proceedings have ended, even where a defendant is served with a warrant while incarcerated in the first county, where a hold or detainer is lodged against him while incarcerated in the first county, or where defendant is brought before the court in the second county, but then is returned again to the custody of the first county.
In order for a defendant to be in the custody of the second county upon termination of proceedings in the first county, defendant must be served with a warrant while incarcerated in the first county.
The service of the Peoria County warrant on defendant effectuated his custody by Peoria County upon the termination of the Sangamon County proceedings.
Stated another way, defendant was legally transferred to the custody of Peoria County once he was sentenced on the Sangamon County conviction.
Accordingly, defendant was in custody of Peoria County after he was sentenced on June 11, 2013, and therefore, section 103-5(a) of the speedy trial statute applies, giving the State 120 days to bring defendant to trial.
Over 120 days passed from the time defendant was taken into custody by Peoria County to the time his motion to dismiss was filed on October 24, 2013, and even more time passed before his trial ultimately took place on December 11, 2013.
Defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated so long as the delay was not attributable to him. Before the trial date, the State asked for a continuance. Defendant objected and told the court he was prepared for trial. The continuance was granted over defendant’s objection. The new trial date that was set was outside of the 120-day speedy trial window.