People v. Ingram, 2018 IL App (4th) 160099 (July). Episode 523 (Duration 6:15)
Defendant plead on a non-automatic transfer charge and now wants a do-over.
Defendant was 16 years old and in adult court on an armed robbery charge.
Defendant and another man, both of whom were armed with dangerous weapons, entered a gas station. The victim would testify that defendant used the weapon to injure his leg and that the men took money from the cash register. It was a gun.
Defendant personally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily harm.
This was an automatic transfer offense. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a).
In exchange for his guilty plea and a sentence of 18 years in prison, the State agreed to amend the charge to armed robbery with a dangerous weapon. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2006).
Standing alone, armed robbery with a dangerous weapon could have been adjudicated in juvenile court. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006).
The trial court accepted the plea agreement.
Defendant appeals, arguing his adult conviction and sentence are void because the amendment of the charging instrument from *** armed robbery with a firearm to armed robbery with a dangerous weapon extinguished criminal court jurisdiction and effectively transferred the case to juvenile court.
Likewise, defendant argues his sentence is void because the State did not request a hearing to sentence him as an adult.
The State, by oral motion, asked to amend the information. Defense counsel stated on the record that he had no objection. The State did not add an additional count or file a new information.
Instead, the prosecutor modified the original information by crossing out and adding new terms. The changes were made with the State’s handwritten modifications.
As it existed at the time of defendant’s offense, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) stated as follows:
“§ 5-130. Excluded jurisdiction.
(1)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with:
(i) first degree murder,
(ii) aggravated criminal sexual assault,
(iii) aggravated battery with a firearm where the minor personally discharged a firearm as defined in Section 2-15.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961,
(iv) armed robbery when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or
(v) aggravated vehicular hijacking when the hijacking was committed with a firearm.
These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.”
The Act explicitly divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction over such criminal matters.
The Act, proceeds to read, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(ii) If after trial or plea the court finds that the minor committed an offense not covered by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), that finding shall not invalidate the verdict or the prosecution of the minor under the criminal laws of the State; however, unless the State requests a hearing for the purpose of sentencing the minor [as an adult], the Court must proceed under Sections 5-705 and 5-710 of this Article. To request a hearing, the State must file a written motion within 10 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict.”
The record clearly demonstrates, and defendant concedes, that the State originally charged defendant with armed robbery with a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2006). This charge, under the plain language of the statute, divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the trial court. 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006).
Likewise, the subsequent modification of the information did not “divest” the trial court of jurisdiction.
The amended charge of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon arose out of the same incident from which defendant was originally charged with armed robbery with a firearm. See People v. King, 241 Ill. 2d 374, 386, 378, 948 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (2011).
The State’s subsequent modification of the information had no legal effect on the trial court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction merely because the State amended the information pursuant to their plea agreement.
Assuming that his adult conviction was proper, defendant argues his sentence is void because the State was required to request a hearing to sentence him as an adult. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(c)(ii) (West 2006).
People v. King
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the “defendant was properly sentenced without a hearing” because he accepted a plea agreement with a predetermined sentence.
In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery with a dangerous weapon in exchange for dismissing the charge of armed robbery with a firearm. Likewise, pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant agreed to be sentenced to 18 years in prison.
Similar to King, we conclude that the State was not required to request a hearing for adult sentencing when both parties already agreed upon the exact sentence to be imposed.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966 (February). Episode 308 (Duration 9:57) (Second Degree Murder Is Not An Automatic Transfer Offense So What Happens When Minor is “Acquitted” of First Degree Murder After A Trial?)
…Quote From Fort
“The facts in the case at bar do not resemble those in King. The defendant in King pled guilty to and was convicted of the charged offense of attempted first degree murder, and his first degree murder charges were not dismissed until after defendant’s sentencing. Id. Unlike King, who was actually charged with attempted first degree murder, defendant was never charged with second degree murder. Thus, in this case, second degree murder is not a “charge[ ] arising out of the same incident” as the first degree murder charges. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2008). Moreover, in King, the parties specifically negotiated the guilty plea procedure with the intent that the minor receive an adult sentence. A negotiated guilty plea involves different concerns than those in defendant’s case. See People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 190 (2005) (when a defendant enters a negotiated guilty plea in exchange for specific benefits, both the State and the defendant must be bound by the terms of the agreement). Accordingly, King is factually distinguishable and does not support the result reached by the appellate court in the instant case.” See paragraph 38.
- People v. Perea, 347 Ill.App.3d 26 (1st Dist. 2004) (no problem when convicted of an uncharged automatic transfer offense)
- In re K.J., 334 Ill.App.3d 947 (1st Dist. 2002) (presumptive transfer on an accountability case must show probable cause on accountability)
- In re Beltran, 327 Ill.App.3d 685 (2nd Dist. 2002) (transfer hearings are dispositional not adjudicatory – minor is properly required to rebut the presumption)
- In re M.C., 319 Ill.App.3d 713 (a transfer case involving a law change that discusses ex post facto retroactivity)
- In re Christopher K.,348 Ill.App.3d 130 (1st Dist. 2004) (EJJP is constitutional – can file EJJP and transfer motion together)