People v. Basile, 2024 IL 129026 (October). Episode 1071 (Duration 12:28)

Here, defendant has utilized the vague and uncertain concerns of a single juror to justify an intrusion on the grand jury’s determination of probable cause by recasting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge into a claim of misleading testimony.

Charges

The State subsequently obtained a grand jury’s bill of indictment charging defendant with two counts of criminal sexual assault. 

See Lower Court Opinion

People v. Basile, 2022 IL App (2d) 210740 (September). Episode 961 (Duration 5:42) (Prosecutor Had A Duty To Correct Inaccurate Information Provided To The Grand Jury)

Issue

Both the circuit court and the appellate court concluded that defendant was denied due process because of prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury, justifying dismissal of the grand jury’s bill of indictment with prejudice.

Facts

Female women told investigator that she was out drinking with male colleague.

She was extremely intoxicated and he had sex with her without her permission.

In the grand jury room, one juror asked, 

“Besides that [Doe] said that this occurred, was there any other evidence that [defendant] actually did this to her?” 

Kelly answered that he did not completely understand the question. The juror then asked, “You said that [Doe] was extremely intoxicated, correct?” 

Kelly responded, “Correct.” 

The juror then asked, “How do we know that the person [Doe] claims did this to her did it to her?”

Kelly answered, “He told me he did.” 

The juror then commented, “That is all I needed to know.”

But He Really Didn’t Confess

In support of the motion to dismiss, defendant submitted the transcript of the grand jury proceeding and a video-recorded interview of defendant in which he 

(1) Told Kelly that the sexual encounter with Doe was consensual,
(2) Denied Doe’s version of events as to lack of consent, and
(3) Denied committing criminal sexual assault.

Trial Court Dismissed Indictment

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, contending that he was denied due process because Kelly’s answers to the grand juror’s questions falsely suggested that he had confessed to committing criminal sexual assault.

At the conclusion of the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, the circuit court concluded that the grand juror’s questions for Kelly did not concern the identity of Doe’s assailant and that Kelly’s answers to the juror’s inquiry essentially informed the grand jury that defendant confessed to sexually assaulting Doe. The circuit court, therefore, concluded that Kelly’s answers to the grand juror’s questions were false and misleading because defendant did not confess to sexually assaulting Doe. 

The appellate court emphasized that, regardless of whether Detective Kelly intended to deceive, the State had a duty to clarify his testimony when Kelly falsely suggested a confession. The appellate court reasoned, 

“Presumably, had the State asked follow-up questions, Kelly would have clarified that defendant had not in fact confessed to sexual assault but, rather, had merely admitted to having consensual sex with [Doe].” 

Although the State maintained that the assistant state’s attorney who presented the case to the grand jury was unfamiliar with the case, the appellate court found this “questionable practice” was not a sufficient excuse for the State’s failure to clarify Kelly’s testimony and did not lessen the prejudicial impact of Kelly’s “deceptive and inaccurate testimony.” 

Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that “there was a clear and unequivocal denial of due process” and that the circuit court properly dismissed the indictment with prejudice. Id. ¶ 24.

The circuit court agreed with the State that, before the juror’s questions, the State had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to support the indictment. 

Nonetheless, the circuit court concluded that Kelly’s false and misleading testimony so prejudiced the grand jury proceeding that the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice. The circuit court, therefore, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, precluding the State from reindicting defendant for the alleged criminal sexual assaults.

Appellate Court agreed with this decision.

Nature and Function of Grand Jury Proceedings 

Where the State utilizes a grand jury to bring charges against an accused, the grand jury’s task is simple: to investigate and determine whether probable cause exists that the accused individual has committed a crime, thus warranting a criminal trial.

A grand jury is a body of laypersons who investigate probable cause free from technical rules. People v. Jones, 19 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (1960). During this process, the state’s attorney serves as an advisor to the grand jury, informing the grand jury of the charges and the applicable law and presenting evidence for the grand jury to consider. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 254; 725 ILCS 5/112-4 (West 2018).

“Only the State’s Attorney, his [or her] reporter and any other person authorized by the court or by law may attend the sessions of the Grand Jury.” 725 ILCS 5/112-6(a) (West 2018). If the grand jury finds probable cause that a person has committed an offense, the State prepares and files with the circuit court a bill of indictment that has been signed by the grand jury’s foreman. Id. § 112-4(d).

This grand jury process is an invaluable part of our system of criminal justice. The grand jury serves as an accusatory body that brings to trial those who may be guilty of a crime (United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973)), but just as importantly, it also stands as a shield between citizens and the State and secures “the innocent against hasty, malicious[,] and oppressive prosecution.” Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).

It determines whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will. Id.; United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (“the grand jury continues to function as a barrier to reckless or unfounded charges”). Therefore, the grand jury’s task “is to clear the innocent, no less than to bring to trial those who may be guilty.” Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 16-17. 

This court has emphasized the importance of preserving the historic independence of the grand jury, expressing reluctance to interfere with the indictment process. People v. Fassler, 153 Ill. 2d 49, 58 (1992). 

Grounds for Dismissal of a Grand Jury’s Indictment: Denial of Due Process

In section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114- 1(a) (West 2018)), the legislature set out statutory grounds for dismissing criminal charges, including grand jury indictments. 

These legislatively established grounds for dismissal are not exclusive. People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 455-56 (1977). 

Section 114-1(a) does not provide a basis for the dismissal of an indictment where an accused’s due process rights are violated, but neither the prosecutor nor the grand jury is vested with power to proceed without regard to due process. People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 35-36 (1971).

In addition, grand jury proceedings are an integral part of the court, not the tool of the prosecutor. Id. Therefore, we have long recognized the court’s corresponding inherent power to supervise and prevent perversion of the grand jury’s process. People v. Boston, 2016 IL 118661, ¶ 19. 

This inherent power includes authority to dismiss an indictment where there has been a “clear denial of due process even though that is not a stated ground in section 114-1.” Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d at 455. 

Issue Issue

There Is Also A Trial

In our system of justice, the most important protection for an accused is a fair trial where a trier of fact determines whether the State has proven the accused guilty  of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

A grand jury proceeding is part of the accusatory stage of the criminal justice process, not the fair trial stage where a defendant’s guilt is ultimately determined.

Grand Jury Role Is Limited

Given its limited (albeit important) role, it has always been thought sufficient for the grand jury to hear only the prosecutor’s side when making its assessment of probable cause.

In addition, the State is not bound by technical evidentiary rules and procedures that are required in a trial before a petit jury to ensure the trial’s fairness.

Accordingly, claims of prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury raise different due process implications than claims of prosecutorial misconduct before a petit jury.

May Not Challenge Sufficiency of the Evidence

Also, a defendant may not challenge the adequacy and sufficiency of the evidence underlying an indictment except where the State presented no evidence connecting the accused to the offense charged. 

When a defendant claims that the evidence presented to the grand jury does not support the charges, “[w]e require only that there be some evidence relative to the charge.” 

Rodgers, 92 Ill. 2d at 290; see Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344-45 (1974) (“the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence considered”).

Here, defendant maintains that he was denied due process stemming from prosecutorial misconduct committed before the grand jury, but he does not dispute that the State presented some evidence to the grand jury connecting him to the commission of the charged offenses. 

Grounds for Dismissal of an Indictment: Prosecutorial Misconduct  

We have held that a defendant may challenge an indictment that is procured through prosecutorial misconduct but that the misconduct must rise to the level of deprivation of due process or a miscarriage of justice (DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 257), which, as stated above, must be unequivocally clear in the record (Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d at 456; Oliver, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 696-97). 

In DiVincenzo, we gave examples of prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury that may result in the denial of a defendant’s due process rights: 

• Deliberately or intentionally misleading the grand jury, 
• Using known perjured or false testimony, or 
• Presenting other deceptive or inaccurate evidence. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 257. 

This court has previously noted the rarity in which Illinois courts will dismiss a grand jury’s indictment on this basis. J.H., 136 Ill. 2d at 12 (“Defendant readily acknowledges, ‘No Illinois case to date dealing with prosecutorial misconduct has found denial of due process established with requisite certainty to warrant dismissal of an indictment’ and ‘no case since Boone v. The People, [148 Ill. 440 (1894),] has found fundamental perversion of the grand jury process itself.’ ”); See also…

• State v. Young, 720 P.2d 965, 970 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (“a dismissal of an indictment with prejudice on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct is rare”);
• State v. Russell, 950 A.2d 418, 430 (R.I. 2008) (“As we have stated many times, the dismissal of an indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct is an extraordinary remedy.”);
• United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986) (the court’s power to dismiss an indictment on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct is “ ‘rarely invoked’ ” (quoting
• United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir.1979)));
• United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Dismissals of indictments for prosecutorial misconduct are rarely upheld.”);
• United States v. Overmyer, 899 F.2d 457, 465 (6th Cir. 1990) (grand jury indictments are presumed valid and a court must “exercise extreme caution in dismissing an indictment for alleged grand jury misconduct”);
• United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal of an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct is considered a drastic step and is generally disfavored as a remedy);
• United States v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Dismissal of an indictment returned after deliberation by a grand jury is a very drastic action.”);
• United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 939 (6th Cir. 1984) (as long as there is “some competent evidence to sustain the charge issued by the Grand Jury” (emphasis in original), an indictment will not be dismissed solely on the basis that other evidence presented to the grand jury may have been false).

Standard for Determining Prejudice From Prosecutorial Misconduct Before a Grand Jury 

This is true because prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury “can usually be ‘remedied adequately by means other than dismissal’ which ‘allow the court to focus on the culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the unprejudiced defendant.’ ”

• J.H., 136 Ill. 2d at 12 (quoting
• Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988)); see
• De Rosa, 783 F.2d at 1405 (“Constitutional grounds for dismissal are limited *** because the grand jury’s determination is a preliminary one and because the full panoply of constitutional protection will be available at trial.”).

In Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256, the United States Supreme Court adopted the following standard for determining prejudice stemming from prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury: 

“We adopt for this purpose, at least where dismissal is sought for nonconstitutional error, the standard articulated by Justice O’CONNOR in her concurring opinion in United States v. Mechanik, [475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.)]. Under this standard, dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only ‘if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict,’ or if there is ‘grave doubt’ that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations.” Id. at 256 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).

The Bank of Nova Scotia Court distinguished this standard from cases where there have been fundamental errors in which the structural protections of the grand jury have been so compromised as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair, allowing the presumption of prejudice, such as racial or gender discrimination in selection of grand jurors. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256- 57 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986), and Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)).

The present case does not present a claim of fundamental error allowing for the presumption of prejudice.

Similarly, in DiVincenzo this court stated, “To warrant dismissal of the indictment, [a] defendant must *** show that the prosecutors prevented the grand jury from returning a meaningful indictment by misleading or coercing it.” DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 258. 

The misconduct must have affected the grand jury’s deliberations. Id. at 257. 

Analysis: The Record in the Present Case Does Not Establish a Due Process Violation With Unequivocal Clarity

Kelly’s recitation of Doe’s version of the events preceded any questions by the grand jurors about Doe’s report of the incident. Kelly gave the grand jurors Doe’s version of the events at this initial accusatory stage of the criminal process where, as explained above, it is sufficient that the grand jury hear only from the prosecution in determining whether probable cause exists to require defendant to submit to a criminal trial. 

• Kelly’s testimony plainly established that Doe reported two incidents of sexual intercourse 
• Committed by defendant without her consent and 
• When she was in a state of being incapable of giving consent. 

At the conclusion of Kelly’s testimony, the prosecutor asked the grand jury whether anyone had any questions for Kelly. A single grand juror took this opportunity to ask Kelly questions. 

None of the other grand jurors had any questions about the State’s legally sufficient probable cause evidence. 

The Question

The transcript of the grand jury proceeding offers no insight into the questioning juror’s unspoken thought process in asking questions beyond the mere words the juror used to ask the questions. 

The inquiring grand juror asked, “Besides that she said that this occurred, was there any other evidence that he actually did this to her?”

This is a vague and nonspecific question that is subject to multiple interpretations, as the question’s phrasing provides no clarity on which specific part of Kelly’s testimony it addresses. 

Specifically, we do not know from reading the transcript whether the juror, in asking this initial question, was concerned with evidence that “this” occurred or evidence that “he” did this to her. The juror’s emphasis could be on “he” or “this.”

If the former, then the juror inquired about additional evidence concerning the identity of the perpetrator.

If the latter, then there is an additional layer of uncertainty concerning whether “this” referred merely to sexual intercourse or whether “this” referred more specifically to unconsented sexual intercourse. 

The transcript offers no insight into what specifically “this” refers to and offers no basis for resolving this uncertainty other than pure speculation. 

Upon being presented with this grand juror’s uncertain inquiry, Kelly appropriately responded, “I’m not completely sure I understand the question.” The record, therefore, establishes Kelly’s confusion about the juror’s question and that Kelly sought clarification so he could accurately address the juror’s concern.

The juror then attempted to clarify, but the juror’s clarification was equally unrevealing with respect to the juror’s specific concern. When Kelly stated that he did not understand the question, the juror responded: “You said the person was extremely intoxicated, correct?” Kelly replied, “Correct.”

The juror then asked, “How do we know that the person she claims did this to her did it to her?”

Here again, in reading the transcript, we are left only to guess whether the juror was concerned with how do we know “the person” who did it to her or whether the juror was concerned with how do we know the person did “it” to her.

 If the latter, we cannot tell if the juror’s use of the term “it” was a reference merely to sexual intercourse or more specifically a reference to nonconsensual sexual intercourse. 

There is no basis in the record to resolve these uncertainties. 

Juror Could Only Have Meant 1 of 3 Things

Accordingly, the juror’s vague questioning presents three possibilities concerning the juror’s unspoken state of mind, and two of the possibilities result in no misleading testimony, much less an unequivocally clear denial of due process. These speculative possibilities are the antithesis of the clarity and certainty a defendant is required to show to justify dismissal of an indictment on the basis of a due process violation. 

❶ As stated, it is possible that the juror could have questioned Kelly because the juror was uncertain whether Doe was reliable in identifying the person who “actually did this to her,” in the juror’s own words. If so, the juror apparently wanted to know from Kelly of the existence of any further evidence that supported Doe’s identification of defendant as the person who “did this to her.” If this was the juror’s concern, Kelly’s response that defendant “told me he did” was not misleading but instead accurately suggested to this juror that defendant told Kelly that he was the person who had sexual intercourse with Doe on the evening in question. 

❷ It is also possible that the juror questioned Kelly because the juror was uncertain with respect to Doe’s reliability in reporting that sexual intercourse occurred at all on the evening in question. Again, if this was the juror’s concern, Kelly’s response to the juror that defendant “told me he did” was not misleading but accurately suggested to this juror that defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with Doe.

Defendant cannot convincingly assert that he established an unequivocally clear deprivation of his due process under these tenuous facts, where Kelly’s answers to the juror’s questions were not misleading under these two distinctly plausible interpretations of the record in a de novo review.

Under either of these two possible interpretations of the juror’s uncertain questions, defendant was not denied due process due to misleading testimony. Defendant cites no reported case where an indictment is dismissed on due process grounds when the record is entirely uncertain whether any misleading testimony was given whatsoever, as is the case here.

❸ According to defendant, the record unquestionably establishes that the juror questioned Kelly because the juror had doubts about Doe’s claim of being unable to give consent to sexual intercourse due to her extreme intoxication. 

It is only under this interpretation of the juror’s questions that we can reach the conclusion that Kelly misled the inquiring juror to believe that defendant confessed to having nonconsensual sexual intercourse with Doe. 

Key Finding

However, nothing in the record lends support to the conclusion that this interpretation of the grand juror’s unspoken state of mind is the only plausible interpretation over and above the other two possible interpretations stated above. 

Accordingly, we can affirm the lower courts’ conclusion that Kelly misled this grand juror only if we elevate this one speculative conclusion of the juror’s concern over the others when there is no basis in the record to do so.

Defendant has the heavy burden to justify dismissal of the indictment, and based on the record before us, we simply cannot conclude, unequivocally, that prosecutorial misconduct affected the grand jury’s deliberations when the record is entirely unclear whether Kelly’s answer to the juror’s vague inquiry misled the inquiring grand juror or any of the other grand jurors in any way whatsoever. 

The record is entirely uncertain concerning whether Kelly gave misleading testimony because that conclusion depends on the unknowable concern of the questioning juror. To hold that defendant “unequivocally” established a prejudicial due process violation, we have to reach the untenable conclusion that the juror’s intent in asking the imprecise questions is clearly ascertainable from the record, which it is not.

Also No Actual and Substantial Prejudice

Even if we could discern from the record that defendant’s interpretation of the juror’s questions is unequivocally clear, Kelly’s answer to the juror’s inquiry still would not be a basis for dismissal of the indictment because defendant cannot show actual and substantial prejudice stemming from the question and answer colloquially between Kelly and the juror. 

Unlike petit juries, grand juries do not have to be unanimous. See 725 ILCS 5/112-2(a) (West 2018) (“The Grand Jury shall consist of 16 persons, 12 of whom shall be necessary to constitute a quorum.”); id. § 112-4(d) (“If 9 grand jurors concur that the evidence before them constitutes probable cause that a person has committed an offense the State’s Attorney shall prepare a Bill of Indictment charging that person with such offense.”). 

Final Comments

See 2022 IL App (2d) 210740, ¶ 21 (where the appellate court in this case engaged in an ill-advised assessment of Doe’s credibility by noting her extreme intoxication and concluding that her account of the events that evening, as reported by Detective Kelly, was “questionable at best”).

Here, a single juror’s vague questions did not open the door for a judicial evaluation of the sufficiency or plausibility of Doe’s report that she was sexually assaulted by defendant. “Guilt or innocence is to be determined at a fair trial” (id.), not in proceedings before the grand jury. 

This analysis is an improper intrusion on the grand jury’s historical independence in conducting its evaluation of probable cause. Fassler, 153 Ill. 2d at 61 (defendant repeatedly characterizes the testimony presented before the grand jury as being “ ‘weak,’ ‘vague,’ ‘implausible,’ and ‘full of inherent contradictions,’ ” but “[a]n accused may not challenge an indictment on the ground that it is not supported by sufficient evidence where there is any evidence to support the indictment” (emphasis added)).

Ideally, the prosecutor or Kelly himself would have asked for additional clarification about the juror’s concern, but their failure to do so does not unequivocally establish that defendant would be denied due process if he stood trial on the grand jury’s bill of indictment. There are no reported cases supporting the dismissal of an indictment based on speculative conclusions that are unsupported by the record particularly where the record, as here, unequivocally establishes that the State presented the grand jury with sufficient probable cause evidence. 

Holding

Dismissal of the grand jury’s bill of indictment under the facts of this case constitutes a speculative intrusion on the grand jury’s independent evaluation of probable cause on two separate levels: (1) unwarranted speculation into what the grand juror was thinking in asking vague and imprecise questions about the possible existence of other evidence on an unspecified element of the charged offenses and (2) unwarranted speculation that the lone juror’s questions were relevant to the silent grand jurors’ evaluation of the legally sufficient probable cause evidence presented by the State.

Therefore, the circuit court exceeded its authority in dismissing the indictment on the record before us. 

Affirming the dismissal of the grand jury’s indictment based on the facts of this case would require us to abandon the well-established principle that we tread lightly and only with certainty when considering dismissal of a grand jury’s indictment based on a claim of a due process violation. The concepts of justice, due process, and a fair trial are not offended in any way by requiring defendant in this case to stand trial on the grand jury’s bill of indictment. The extreme sanction of dismissal of the indictment is not warranted.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand for further proceedings on the grand jury’s bill of indictment.

Judgments reversed. 

Cause remanded.

See Also

• People v. Oliver, 368 Ill. App. 3d 690, 696 (2006) (entirety of misleading information established probable cause where none existed)
• Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 456 (1977)(the circuit court has inherent authority to dismiss where there has been an “unequivocally clear” denial of due process);
• People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245, 256 (1996) (“To support a motion to dismiss an indictment on due process grounds, a defendant must show both actual and substantial prejudice.”)
• People v. Holmes, 397 Ill. App. 3d 737, 741 (2010)
• United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (“Because the grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial.”) (“the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence considered”).
• People v. Creque, 72 Ill. 2d 515, 527 (1978); 
• People v. Rodgers, 92 Ill. 2d 283, 286 (1982) (“there are numerous cases which indicate that a court will not consider the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence” presented to a grand jury)
• People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 255 (1998)
• People v. Jackson, 64 Ill. App. 3d 307, 310 (1978)
• People v. J.H., 136 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1990)
• Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988)
• United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992)
• People v. Chatman, 297 Ill. App. 3d 57, 62 (1998) (courts are reluctant to dismiss an indictment on due process grounds unless the indictment is “utterly empty”)
• Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases And Examples
• Filing A Motion To Dismiss In Illinois
• People v. Boston, 2016 IL 118661 (February 2016) (Episode 144 Duration 6:29) (An Example of Sloppy Grand Jury Work)
• See Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases And Examples
• See also the Illinois resource page on proper charges
• People v. Rebollar-Vergara, 2019 IL App (2d) 140871 (March). Episode 616 (Duration 15:29) (Prosecutors Questions Could Have Been Presented More Clearly And Completely In The Grand Jury Room)
• People v. O’Dette, 2017 IL App (2d) 150884 (March). Episode 333 (Duration 13:56) (Subpoena Abuse: Every Single Detective In Lake County Is Sworn In As a Grand Jury Investigator)
• People v. Rebollar-Vergara, 2019 IL App (2d) 140871 (March). Episode 616 (Duration 15:29) (Officers Have To Be Very Careful About How They Answer Questions In The Grand Jury Room)
• People v. Nolan, 2019 IL App (2d) 180354 (April). Episode 627 (Duration 9:29) (Why It Can’t Be Too Easy To Challenge A Grand Jury Indictment)
• Episode 596 – In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949 (January) (Grand Jury Secrecy Is Kind Of A Big Thing Press Not Allowed To Get Some Documents) 
• People v. Cunningham, 2018 IL App (1st) 153367 (June). Episode 517 (Duration 12:37) (Significance Of The Evidence And Bad Faith Drive Discovery Violation And Destruction Of Evidence Issues)